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THE MODERN CHURCHMAN

A Magazine to maintain the cause of
TRUTH, FREEDOM, and COMPREHENSIVENESS
in the Church of England.

EDITOR: H. D. A. MAJOR, B.D.

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

The Modernism of *The Challenge*.

Since the Rev. C. E. Raven, B.D., resigned the position of Dean of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, to become a parochial clergyman and to take over the editorship of the *Challenge*, that weekly Church newspaper has adopted a definitely liberal attitude in theology. Its declaration of policy may be said to have begun with the publication on February 25th of a sermon, entitled 'The New Reformation,' preached by the editor before the University of Cambridge on February 20th. That sermon, amongst other things, advocated the urgent need for doctrinal restatement. The preacher said :

> If any of you doubt the reality of this failure or believe that the old paths may still be followed without disaster, let us consider for a moment the . . . present doctrinal position of the Church of England . . . A long line of lonely scholars has for many years stood for liberty, for the right of Churchmen to reinterpret their belief in terms of the thought of their own time. Until very recently such men were subjected to persecution, as they still are to abuse and slander. . . . But the Church, the Church for whom they laboured and suffered, the Church whose treasures of devotional life they could but venerate and envy, is as yet unmoved.
>
> Of her two great parties, one is now with the utmost caution and after years of uncertainty beginning to cut itself free: the Evangelicals appear to have at last repudiated their bondage to the literal interpretation of the Scriptures, and to be almost ready to restate their principles in terms of to-day. The other has openly declared war against all change except in a backward direction. The Anglo-Catholics stand committed by their latest pronouncements to the unquestioning acceptance of all that the Undivided Church has taught, and by that standard propose to test and to measure the reliability of more recent knowledge. And at present even this much concession to the needs of to-day is refused us. The

Report of their Congress last June is a declaration of their theologica bankruptcy. We search their writings to find the bread of life, for whic the world is hungering. And we find, alas that it should be so, only th stones of ancient formularies, the scorpions of ancient superstitions. Tak one instance. Nothing is more obviously vital than the restatement o the doctrine of the Incarnation. Biology and psychology have profoundl modified the whole content of the words God and man: critical scienc has recovered for us a fresh portrait of Jesus: and yet the heirs c Catholicism have hitherto only given us treatises based upon the historica accuracy of the Fourth Gospel and couched in terms of the question begging formula of Chalcedon.

On March 4th, the Editor followed this up by addressing a appeal to Anglo-Catholics to assist in the task of theologica restatement. The Editor pointed out that, owing to Anglo Catholic opposition to theological restatement, the Englis Church is losing its grip of thinking and religious young me and women.

The student world finds its theology in the writings of men often quit out of touch with Catholic Christianity, and in all cases definitely oppose to the position taken up (say) by the Anglo-Catholic Congress. Book like Glover's *Jesus of History*, Fosdick's *Manhood of the Master*, Gray' *Christian Adventure*, and on the more definitely theological side the work of the Cumnor group and of the Dean of Carlisle are being very widel read—more so than any other religious writings of the time. The studen realises that certain methods of historical research cannot be refused un less Christianity is to become frankly obscurantist: he believes intensel in the need for absolute sincerity and in the value of evidence: he has profound distrust of catch-words and does not pretend to understand th language or to share the ideas of the Fourth Century. But he has n hostility to creeds or doctrines, provided their essential significance ca be intelligibly explained to him; nor is he unwilling to speculate unless is assumed that speculative subjects can be settled by an appeal t authority. In fact he is simply asking that the Christian experience o the ages shall be given to him in a form and in language that he ca understand.

And this demand for a theology has become imperative.

The Anglo-Catholic scholars of a more liberal type the Edito believes to be quite capable of contributing valuable help. H writes:

There are among Anglo-Catholics many who accept the methods an even to some extent the conclusions of recent scholarship, and have no hesitated to abandon belief in certain of the fundamental convictions o the Undivided Church, for example, its universal acceptance of the in errancy of Scripture. It is to these men, many of them persons o academic distinction, that we appeal, begging them not to refuse the help through fear of splitting their party or offending their fellows, an urging the critical nature of the time as our excuse for the earnestness o our words. We speak for a number who long to know what the repr sentatives of the historic continuity of Christendom have to say about th Person of Christ, and the scope of His Atonement, and the doctrine o

the Eucharist, and the meaning of the supernatural. Is Anglo-Catholicism prepared to defend the literal historicity of the discourses in the Fourth Gospel, or the dogma of the Two Wills, or the canonization of Cyril of Alexandria, or the monastic view of sex? We ask these questions in no spirit of hostility and with no ulterior motive except the desire to know where the Catholic Party stands. We believe that the supreme need of the Church, if it is to recover its position and influence, is the formulation of a satisfying theology. We regard the Anglo-Catholics as fitted by their traditions and membership, and compelled by the greatness of their claims, to take a great share in that task. We are most reluctant to believe that they cannot: but in view of the extreme urgency of the time we know of no reason except inability which can justify them in keeping silence.

To this appeal the *Church Times* replied in a leading article on March 18th. Its main plea was that Anglo-Catholics had been fighting too hard for their existence to be able to give very much thought to their theology, and that they were still a little uneasy owing to the truculent designs of the Dean of St. Paul's. The *Church Times* claimed that Dr. Gore and the *Lux Mundi* school had done valuable work—this all Liberals will acknowledge with gratitude—and that Anglo-Catholics gravely doubted whether it is possible at the present time to formulate 'a satisfying theology.'

We agree with the *Church Times* on the latter point—where there is advancing knowledge it is probable that a permanently satisfying theology can never be attained, but we do not agree with our stricter Anglo-Catholics in regarding the traditional theology as adequate, or that it is not a very serious and pressing duty in times of great intellectual development and unrest like the present to make every effort in a spirit of reverence and truth to bring our theology up-to-date.

As Liberals we are grateful to the *Challenge* for courageously voicing a demand which is seldom rightly heard or rightly understood by the clergy of the Catholic and Evangelical schools, but which must be heard aright and acted upon, cost what it may to the individuals who voice it.

We believe that it has already cost the *Challenge* the loss of some of its supporters. Will others come forward and take their place?

The Free Church Response to Lambeth.

The recent response of the representatives of the Free Churches to the Lambeth appeal for Christian unity is deserv-

ing of the greatest attention. It is not, strictly speaking, a reply to that appeal, but a reasoned review of it addressed by the Free Church leaders to their own people.

That review scrutinized in the cold light of reason holds out little hope of the Mansfield Conference compromise of 1920 being accepted by the Free Churches. Whatever some of the Free Church leaders might be willing to adventure in that direction, it seems clear that the great body of their people would not follow them.

We are not quite sure that we regret this. The immediate results of the compromise, could it be acted on, would be most advantageous to the influence of the Christian Church in this land and throughout the Empire, but we are not so clear that its future results might not be detrimental to the moral and spiritual vigour of British Christianity. There are dangers about a scheme of re-union which places so much emphasis on ecclesiastical order as that proposed by Lambeth, although it could not possibly have been proposed in a more reasonable and conciliatory spirit by our bishops. But 'facts are chiels that winna ding': episcopacy is a fact, and it has a history, and that history is seen in one light by the Catholic and in another light by the Free Churchman. Moreover, as Aristotle remarked, although men differ about small points, the reasons for their difference are never small. The difference in the two estimates of episcopacy points to a fundamentally different estimate of the essential character of the Christian religion by the two parties. Can those who differ so widely in that estimate associate together as Christians in a spirit of fellowship? We believe they can. Because we believe that, we would urge that re-union by unity of organization having been blocked, the re-unionists should proceed by way of Christian fellowship. The symbol of that fellowship is found not in one system of Church government, but in the Holy Communion. Let us then take steps to promote intercommunion between Anglican and Free Churchmen, whilst we strive at the same time to secure co-operation in the practical application of Christian principles to the guidance of our economic and social life. As Canon J. M. Wilson has recently said:

> 'Inter-communion, the welcoming at all our Altars and Holy Tables the communicants of other groups, at their own wish, is to

first aim and the condition of greater unity in the future. Each fold will make its own qualification for its own communicants; the Catholic Church welcomes all.'

Some Influential Parish Magazines.

It is not unusual to regard the Parish Magazine as the feeblest teacher of religious truth. Its practical purpose seems to be to serve as an advertizing medium, and that not so much of commodities as of persons.

There are, however, at least in the metropolitan area, several parish magazines which cannot justly be regarded in this way. The magazines of St. Martin's-in-the-Fields, Chipping Barnet Parish Church, and St. Ethelburga's within Bishopgate, although differing widely from each other, are yet conspicuous as making a serious and courageous effort to deal with live problems of religion and life in an up-to-date way, and so give their readers something to *think* about.

As an example of this we cull the following from *The Leaflet*, the parish magazine of St. Ethelburga the Virgin:

Notes on the Fourth Gospel.

Commencing in October, 1906, we have month by month steadily pursued our enquiry whether the hypotheses on which our enquiry was based is justified by the facts disclosed. These were that our Gospel is mystical rather than historical, that it seeks to edify rather than to relate fact, and has a polemical character in addition. Those of our readers who have followed the expositions of the Gospel in detail must now judge whether the hypotheses were sound or not.

Certainly, we claim no assurance that we have in every case penetrated to the heart of the mystery we have been exploring. More often than is pleasant we have had to guess where we should have liked a higher probability. And the very lucidity and directness of the author's style have no doubt misled us sometimes into a too facile belief that here and there nothing called for explanation. Moreover, our ignorance of the special circumstances which attended the writing of the Gospel; the uncertainty which hangs round the identity of the writer, and perhaps will for ever hang round him; our imperfect knowledge of the precise course of development of Christian thought in the century which followed on the death of Jesus; and the impossibility of fixing exactly the date and place of the appearance of the Gospel—all these combine to deprive our results of anything approaching mathematical certainty.

Yet, for all that, those results are not without some degree of probability, and perhaps some high degree. Nor are they valueless. It is anyhow plain to the most cursory reader of the Gospel that its subject-matter is not plain matter of fact. The Gospel-story is treated indeed as a series of 'sign-facts,' as all objects of perceptual experience are. But in the telling of them the emphasis is on the 'sign' factor, and the fact tends to sink into the background.

Thus, for example, **the** sign of the turning the water into wine is

explicitly declared to be the 'beginning of signs.' A sign of what? And the feeding of the five thousand is made the basis of a long sermon in which the fact becomes negligible, and its meaning alone occupies the field. Similarly the story of the healing of the impotent man is but the picturesque base for an exposition of the relation of the Son to the Father. So, too, the story of the restoration of sight to a blind man is used to illustrate the incorrigible opposition between the religion of Jesus and the religion of the Jews.

If we turn to the discourses of Jesus, we can hardly escape a recognition of their mystical character. The discourse on the True Vine, or on the Fair Shepherd, moves in a rarer atmosphere than that of theology, or ethics. And from the beginning of the fourteenth chapter to the end of the seventeenth the impression of the unearthly character of the teaching is intensified. Indeed, the apparent simplicity of the Gospel throughout veils from many readers the complexity of its metaphysic base. But to a prepared mind there will disclose itself on prolonged reflection the conviction that the simplicity is gained by the deliberate rejection of many a popular conception of the religion of the Crucified. The phenomenal is swallowed up in the 'intelligible' world; the earthly life is but the prelude to the heavenly. The things which are seen are temporal, and they do but provide the embodiment and setting forth of the things which are not seen.

It would be unreasonable, therefore, to regard our Gospel as a sort of gleaning of the grapes of Ephraim, a collection of incidents, or a body of teaching which had somehow escaped the researches of the Synoptics. The author is following a familiar Jewish method of teaching, that known as Haggadah, in which the doctrine is the thing, and the authority of tradition or of fact is subsidiary. Is there, therefore, anything surprising in the supposition that a book like our Fourth Gospel should show signs of the same tendency to make history subservient to edification? And if we can detect traces of the same tendency in the Synoptic Gospels and in St. Paul's writings, our reluctance to treat the Fourth Gospel as haggadistic will be found unreasonable. But it is generally agreed that such traces exist and can be found without any great difficulty.

This extract is not exceptional, but characteristic. By many Churchmen it would be regarded as too advanced for a ruri-decanal clerical society, and would lay its author open to the imputation of being a rather extreme and dangerous person. It is at least significant to see it in a parish magazine which depends for its support not upon its advertisements, but upon the fact that it contributes to the religious and mental life of its readers.

The Two Voices.

We always read Canon J. M. Wilson with interest. He has the gift of luminous and convincing exposition. In a series of articles in the *Guardian*, he has been treating a well-worn subject, 'Historic Causes of Disunion in the Church,' yet in such a way as to arrest attention. Those of our readers

who value the Establishment, if for no other reason than for the bishops it gives us, or perhaps we ought to say, those from whom it delivers us, will appreciate the following paragraph:

There is a great unorganised spirit of Christianity. It finds no voice for itself. It silently stands outside our Churches. It was the failure of the Roman Church to detect and value this growing subconscious piety that lost her the North of Europe. How can we avoid this failure, and the exclusion of these precious elements from every section of the Church, is the immediate problem of to-day that demands foresight and true statesmanship.

This lesson is not only one of the most important, but also one of the most likely to be overlooked and ignored. It is so for this reason. Jowett once quoted to me an aphorism—which, if I remember right, he attributed to Captain Cook—that 'the success of the best preventive measures led frequently to their being undervalued. When completely successful in averting some evil, people without knowledge of the past failed to see any reason for them, and were ready to abolish them.' Good illustrations will occur to every one—the law of institution and induction to benefices, for example, or compulsory vaccination. But perhaps the best illustration is the appointment by the Crown to high ecclesiastical office. Think what evils this has left no room for, evils that would arise at once, faintly suggested by the election of a humble Proctor in Convocation, imperfectly paralleled by the caucus in civil elections. Think how this method of appointment has contributed to retain some hold of the Church on the nation as a whole by the gradual introduction, often among reluctant authorities, of the living 'certainties of contemporary conviction.' Here surely is a lesson to be learned from the laboratory of history—that, however attractive at the moment closely limited elections or co-option may seem, yet for the appointment to high posts in the Church no surer method could be found for converting our great and wide Church ere long into a reactionary sect than the entrusting the final selection to such posts to anyone less responsible than the representative of the whole nation, the Crown and its Prime Minister. Nothing, in my opinion, could be more assuredly fatal than thus to sacrifice the national character of the Church of England (p. 252).

We may set beside this utterance of a Senior Wrangler and great religious educationist a quotation from the *New Statesman* of August 28th, 1920, describing an incident at the Anglo-Catholic Conference in the Albert Hall:

Several speakers, including two of the most respected missionary bishops, denounced the Establishment in terms which might have been thought fifty years ago a little strong at a Liberation Society meeting, and their denunciation was greeted with roars of applause from an audience which packed the great Hall.

The *Parva Carta* of the Laity.

Humbly imitating in some small degree the faith of the patriarch of whom we are told that he 'in hope believed against hope,' we hailed the Parochial Church Councils' measure in its earlier stages as the Magna Carta of the laity.

Alas! in running the gauntlet of the Church Assembly the Magna Carta has grown smaller by degrees and beautifully less, and emerged on February 5th with the final approval of the Church Assembly no longer a Magna Carta, but a Parva Carta.

Those who hoped that the measure was to increase the power of the parochial laity, particularly in the way of protecting them against liturgical novelties which they do not desire in their parochial services, will find the laity to be exactly where they were before. Under this new measure Parochial Church Councils may make representations to the bishop. This power of presenting persons and things to the bishop has been possessed by the churchwardens for centuries, but it has been little protection in these matters during the last fifty years.

We have no guarantee in the new measure that if the Parochial Council are opposed to an alteration in the services their objection will be sustained on appeal to the bishop, or if they desire an alteration that it will be granted.

Quite recently a bishop in one diocese has granted a request by a Parochial Council that incense might be used ceremonially, while a bishop in another diocese has refused the request of a Parochial Council that the liturgy of the Scottish Prayer Book might be substituted for that of the English. We offer no criticism of these episcopal decisions, but would only point out what is obvious, that the power is not in the hands of the parochial laity, but in the hands of the bishop. This we are not disposed to regard as a movement in the right direction, nor is it what the laity were led to expect would be the result of granting legal status and rights to Parochial Church Councils. While our bishops are appointed as at present, we do not know that this increase in episcopal power matters greatly, but should the mode of episcopal appointment be changed, it might prove disastrous.

Viewed generally, we regard the tendency of the Parochial Church Councils' measure to be centralizing and bureaucratic. It seems to us that, although the burdens of finance and parochial endowments are laid on the shoulders of the parochial laity, the diocesan authority will exercise an increasing control over all parochial expenditure. This will seem to some a good

thing; we believe it is really a bad thing, because power to spend is best vested in those who give, and certainly it is not what the parochial laity anticipated. We fear that as they experience the slowly but surely tightening grip of the diocesan authority, they will lose heart and interest.

The Eighth Conference of Modern Churchmen.

The following arrangements have been made for the Conference to be held at Girton College, August 8—15. At the five morning sessions the subject for consideration is our Lord Jesus Christ. At each of these two papers will be read. The division of the subject and the readers of the papers will be as follows :—

TUESDAY.—*What do we know about Jesus?*

C. W. Emmet, B.D., Fellow of University College, Oxford.

R. H. Lightfoot, M.A., Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford.

WEDNESDAY.—*Jesus as the Revealer of God.*

Canon R. B. Tollinton, D.D.

J. W. Hunkin, M.A., Dean of Caius College, Cambridge.

THURSDAY.—*The Centrality of the Person and Work of Jesus.*

Canon Barnes, D.Sc., F.R.S.

The Headmaster of Sherborne.

FRIDAY.—*Jesus as the Logos and Son of God.*

The Very Rev. H. Rashdall, D.D., D.Litt., F.B.A.

H. D. A. Major, B.D.

SATURDAY.—*Jesus as both Human and Divine.*

Prof. Bethune Baker, D.D.

R. G. Parsons, M.A. (sometime Principal of Wells Theological College).

At the four evening sessions the questions propounded by the Committee of the World Conference of Faith and Order will be considered. There will be two papers in answer to each question.

TUESDAY.—*What degree of unity in Faith will be necessary in a re-united Church?*

Prof. W. R. Sorley and Canon J. H. Bindley, D.D.

WEDNESDAY.—*Is the statement of this one Faith in the form of a Creed necessary or desirable?*

The Master of Marlborough and L. S. Hunter, M.A.

THURSDAY.—*If so, what Creed should be used? or what other formulary would be desirable?*

J. C. Hardwick, M.A., and Dr. Douglas White.

FRIDAY.—*What are the proper uses of a Creed and of a Confession of Faith?*

Prof. Percy Gardner, F.B.A., and Harold Anson, M.A.

The opening address will be delivered on Monday evening by Canon Glazebrook, D.D., and this will be followed by a devotional service conducted by J. H. Skrine, D.D., in the College Chapel. As at former Conferences, each day will begin with the celebration of Holy Communion, and there will be a devotional service daily at 6 p.m., conducted by the Revs. C. R. Shaw-Stewart, E. Salisbury Jose, Hubert Handley and W. D. Bainbridge Bell. At the Sunday morning service in Girton Chapel, Canon Barnes, of Westminster, will preach.

Miss Nussey, of Westfield, Ilkley, is the Hon. Secretary of the Conference, and to her applications should be made for tickets.

THE TASK OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY

BY THE EDITOR.

A STRIKING article, 'Continuity in Change,' in the *Times Literary Supplement* of March 24th, indicates with urbanity and insight the task of modern Christianity. The writer regards that task as twofold: (1) To re-state the traditional christology, in other words, answer the question, 'What think ye of Christ?' in terms which will satisfy the modern man's conception of historical truth, moral and spiritual need and devotional practice: and (2) to reconcile the sincere acceptance of the Christian ideal of life with a free and generous view of civilization. These tasks are old—as we read Church History, it seems to us that Christianity has been more or less engaged on them since the second century—but their urgency is new. To-day the Christian Church is facing the whole world simultaneously—modern philosophies and Oriental religions, economic methods and aesthetic ideals, scientific theories

and historical criticism have all got to be reckoned with. They have to be brought into subjection to the obedience of Christ; they have to be grouped under His leadership, or the Christian Church must abdicate its claim to be the Catholic Church, and abandon all hope of directing human evolution. There are some who hold that that claim to Catholicity ought never to have been made. That claim, they urge, comes not from Jesus Christ, but from Paul the traveller and Roman citizen. Jesus knew nothing of a Catholic Church. He was content to teach: 'Strait is the road and narrow is the gate that leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it.' He did not foresee the Orontes and the Tiber, still less the Thames and the Mississippi, mingling their turgid floods with the healing waters of Shiloah and demanding to be cleansed by the process.

Yet that view of Jesus Christ fails to do justice to the universal aspect of His teaching and mission. The words of the Johannine Christ—'I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me': 'I am not come to condemn the world, but to save the world': 'I am come that they may have life, and that they may have it abundantly'—do reflect aspects of the Jesus of the Synoptists, the Herald and Revealer of the Kingdom of God, who came to give His life a ransom for many, who invited all who were weary and heavy laden to come to Him, who declared that wherever His gospel should be preached throughout the whole world, there should also a deed of beautiful devotion (*καλὸν ἔργον*) be told as a memorial of her who had done it. Whether He knew aught of a Catholic Church we may, as historians, reasonably doubt, but we may not doubt that He believed in a universal Kingdom of God, into which all who would might enter, if they would but accept His guidance.

It hardly seems possible, then, for any Christian not to claim that the Gospel of Jesus is a Gospel, nay, *the* Gospel of Life for all men, always and everywhere. If that be so, it must follow that the company of those who receive that Gospel must constitute potentially the Catholic, or Universal, Church of Humanity.

But the writer in the *Literary Supplement* complains of a certain exclusiveness in the Christian ideal of life which pre-

vents it from accepting whole-heartedly many of the delightful and beautiful things of life and making them freely its own. The world of culture and of art has turned chill at the breath of the pale Galilaean. Christianity is tinged, in some cases dominated, by Oriental asceticism. For example, the mutual love of man and woman, the undying theme of poets and painters, the Church has been inclined to place below the virtue of virginity. Art in the form of music, sculpture, painting, architecture, the Church has consented to use for religious purposes: at first tentatively, afterwards lavishly, but always with some sense of misgiving. Christian revivals, whether Monastic or Quaker, have invariably aimed at aesthetic severity and simplicity, with perhaps the one exception of the Tractarian movement, which was closely allied to Romanticism. The Christian saints have worshipped the sacrifice of the Crucified: they have honoured those who have striven to imitate that sacrifice by patient deeds of love: the Gothic architecture of a William de Sens, the Mass music of a Palestrina, the frescoes of a Fra Angelico, have approved themselves to the Christian consciousness not because of their aesthetic quality but because they were created *ad majorem Dei gloriam*, and inspired men to give themselves not to the worship of beauty but to the service of Christ. St. Francis, who delighted in the fresh beauty of Nature, felt a deeper joy in kneeling before the crucifix. We shall misjudge the spirit of Christianity if we do not recognize this fact. Undoubtedly 'the Son of Man came eating and drinking,' but the fact that He was crucified created a deeper impression. The Christian religion was born amid tribulation: its early leaders and teachers faced persecution and death on its behalf; its attitude was world-renouncing; can it now change that attitude without being guilty of a fundamental disloyalty? If it cannot, individual men and women may yet be Christians, but a Christian world civilization is an impossibility.

But if the Christian religion is to become world-accepting it must be so whole-heartedly, and it must be so rationally in the widest sense of that term. Christ had no use for the half-hearted, and the world has no use for them either. The Christian Church must think out once again its relation to the world, and to human nature, and if it be sure that this is God's

world, that human beings are essentially children of God, that God has given us all things, gifts of love, gifts of beauty, gifts of intellect, richly to enjoy, it must teach this Gospel with vigour and full assurance. It must condemn all doctrines and practices, all petty pieties and pious phrases, which teach or seem to teach otherwise. It is a dangerous policy doubtless; it may land the Christian religion in a sensuous Hedonism; it may make light of sin; it may lower moral standards; it may weaken the call of duty; a gospel of aesthetic utilitarianism may replace the doctrine of the Cross. Yet there is no need that this should be so in setting forth the Gospel of the Kingdom. The living of that Gospel demands self-discipline and it demands self-sacrifice, but not of the ascetic Oriental type. It demands nothing that is irrational or ecstatic. There is need, then, for the Christian Church, if it is to be the Church of western civilization, to extend the range of its moral teaching by developing its implications and re-adjusting its applications. This demand is coming from an unexpected quarter. We do not refer to the Labour Movement, which seems to-day to be economic and political rather than moral; but to the Aesthetic Movement, which is disinterestedly desirous of promoting a nobler civilization. That movement, which we owe mainly to Ruskin and William Morris, is steadily gathering momentum in England, but it is clear that it has little interest in a Christian Church which allows its members without any sign of disapprobation to grow rich by building potential slums, providing vulgar amusements, flaunting hideous and untruthful advertisements—a Church which shudders at an expletive but has too little to say in its sermons in condemnation of unhealthy bodies, ill-educated minds, unpleasant manners, coarse amusements, dirty habits, untidy and inconsiderate tricks. Yet there are many indications that not a few of the clergy are striving to-day, and not with too much support from the laity, to substitute for a conventional morality—largely mediaeval and Puritan—a morality of a wider and more searching character as free from irrational exclusiveness as from feeble tolerance.

So much, then, for the one great task of modern Christianity. What of the other?—to provide a convincing theology. The

writer in the *Literary Supplement* declares that for the mod mind:

> 'All the creeds . . . contain statements which must seem t either untrue, or at least far too bold, clear cut, and precise for touching of these high mysteries. We need more of silence, m of freedom, one may say, more of poetry: and less of confi logic and ingenious metaphysics' (p. 185).

This is true enough, but it does not settle the question, see that the Anglican authorities show little disposition to mod the creeds or their use, save perhaps in the case of the *Q cunque Vult*. But the writer, like a loyal Anglican, feels t

> 'There must be a middle way between the system which buri (the Christian Religion) in legends and ceremonies, and that wh dissolves it in sentimental humanitarianism or politics.'

Certainly there ought to be, but little good is served nowad by attacking these things in the name of Christianity. Legen will pass into the sphere of poetry as the historical sense our communities develops; ceremonies, if they be historic a aesthetic, are seen to-day to have a value in religious worsh which somewhat tames our native Puritan iconoclasm; huma tarianism and politics cannot be excluded from the purview a Church that claims to be Catholic, although the politicia always wish that they could.

But the writer is on surer ground when he states that a though a new Christology is needed, yet it is a Christolo which must preserve and hold fast the values of the old.

> 'The old doctrines or explanations of the Person of Christ m appear now rigid or unsatisfying. But some doctrine on that gr question there must be, for experience as well as reason seems show that unless Christ be accepted as . . . the unique Son, som thing which other sons are not, there is an end of the Christian re gion.'

But he feels that we need for our moral and spiritual life mo than the historical Jesus supplies.

> 'We need a spiritual and universal Christ, who includes but tra scends the Jesus of the Gospels.'

In recent years we have been made to realize the limitatio imposed by the historical on the eternal; now we need realize how historical limitations can be supplemented and t finite rendered universal and eternal by the action of the Spir

This has been attempted in the Pauline epistles and t Fourth Gospel. Unfortunately these magnificent and cla

sical presentations of the historical Jesus in terms of the Eternal Christ have been narrowed and hardened, and in a measure confused for us by the dogmatic efforts of the period of the General Councils. It is the terms and categories inherited from that period which seem to be at least partly responsible for the failure of Christian teachers to-day to win the conviction of our educated classes. The traditional theology, as they know best who have tried to teach it, does not grip the modern man, yet the historic Jesus never fails to attract him. If we must have a theology, and we are told that this is needful, then we do need a new theology to be constructed by those who, going over all the facts as we know them to-day—facts of history and facts of religious experience—will represent them in a modern setting and in modern terms.

The conflict between creed and conduct is no doubt serious, but the conflict between creed and conviction is more serious still, and that not less because it is not so obvious. We are faced with this now. The number of convinced Christians among modern-minded men and women is few—many are ready to be convinced, but the traditional theology fails to convince them. The theology needful to convince them has yet to be formulated by our Christian thinkers, and when it is formulated it will probably be most bitterly opposed by the conservative elements in the Church. Yet until that synthesis of historic fact, rational thought, moral ideal and devotional expression can be achieved, the four rivers which ought to water Paradise are dammed back, and our modern civilization threatens to become a waste of marsh and desert.

Some will affirm that this is much too academic a programme for modern Christianity. That the real task of modern Christianity is to abolish our slums, remedy social injustice, humanize and moralize industrial competition, promote international peace, train our youth in habits of chastity, temperance and industry. This is true in the sense that the Church ought certainly to be helping to do these things; but the point is that it is not the whole of the Church's duty to-day. There is an even harder task behind and beneath it. It lies in the realm of thought. May we not hope that the coming Modern Churchmen's Conference at Girton will help us here?

THE NEMESIS OF A CHILDISH THEOLOGY*

By the Very Rev. W. R. Inge, D.D., Dean of St. Paul's.

SPIRITUAL things, says St. Paul, are spiritually discerned. But they cannot be spiritually imagined or depicted or described, because our eyes cannot see them and our words cannot express them. We have to translate them into the language of everyday experience, using symbols or metaphors which we know to be always inadequate and often misleading.

One of the oldest of these conventional symbols is to represent what is good as above us, and what is bad as beneath us. To ascend means to grow better, to descend means to grow worse. High and low are synonyms of noble and base.

There was a time when most people took these symbols literally. They knew so little of astronomy that they pictured God as dwelling beyond the firmament of heaven, and the devil in a subterranean prison, which occasionally burst out in volcanic eruptions. It is difficult to say how much of this picture-book theology still remains in the minds of the people. Probably if I were to say that we cannot get 20,000 feet nearer to the throne of God by going up in an aeroplane or climbing a mountain in the Andes, you would all say, 'Of course we all know that.' But if I were to say, 'There is no place in the universe where we should be nearer to God than where we are now,' some of you might be offended, though the statement is probably true and certainly orthodox. The old theologians used to say, 'God has His centre everywhere, and his circumference nowhere.' In other words, heaven and hell are not names of places; there is no theological geography or astronomy.

If this were only a problem for philosophers, I should not mention it here. But I think that these symbols of up and down, of higher and lower, are still accepted literally by a great

* A sermon preached in St. Paul's Cathedral on Easter Day, 1921 from Col. III, 1-3.

many people, and that they do great harm, though I repeat that as symbols they are natural and right. They do harm, because to everyone who has acquired even the rudiments of natural science they are manifestly absurd; there is no up or down in space. If heaven is above our heads in England, it must be beneath our feet when we go to New Zealand. But besides this, we have most of us been misled by these metaphors into thinking of two worlds, or perhaps three, locally separated—the home of God and blessed spirits, our familiar world, and the place of punishment; or we might say that the universe of simple piety is a three-storied house.

If we question the average irreligious man, especially if he is a keen social reformer, and ask him why he rejects Christianity, he will say: 'Christianity offers me a happy home away in the clouds, and in the distant future; and it tells me that I ought to invest my all in the shares of this undiscovered country. I suspect the whole thing to be a fraud; the only world I know is this earth, and I mean to make the most of it while I can, for myself and my mates.' This is secularism, the great enemy of Christianity; and I think it is largely due to a sheer mistake about the Christian religion. These men have been taught a fairy tale and told that this is Christianity. If they are bitter politicians, they can easily persuade themselves that the clergy are trying to pay them in bad paper money. I wish to urge very earnestly that secularism is the natural and inevitable nemesis of a superstitious and childish theology. Popular religion has banished God, and turned the clergy into rent-collectors for an absentee landlord. The people, who know that they have very difficult practical problems to face, resent being told that heaven—somewhere among the stars—is their home.

It is a tragic blunder. Look at the Epistle for to-day. 'If ye then be risen with Christ, seek those things which are above, where Christ sitteth at the right hand of God. Set your affection on things above, not on things on the earth. For ye died, and your life is hid with Christ in God. Mortify therefore your members which are on the earth.' Is it not plain that all these expressions—death and rising again, earth and the things above, God's right hand and the life hidden with Christ, are to be taken in a spiritual sense? High and

low in religion are as conventional expressions as high and lo notes in music. The ancients, as it happens, called the ba high and the treble low. It is a mere convention; there is n meaning in it.

But, you will say, St. Paul does contrast the two world the contrast between flesh and spirit, between earth and heave runs all through his epistles. Certainly he does; but let m ask you to put these spatial metaphors aside, and consid what the two worlds really mean.

The average man thinks that his picture of reality is som thing given to him from outside, that it is a coherent and co sistent world guaranteed by science and verified by experienc It is really nothing of the kind. Physical science gives u nothing but the minutest particles—perhaps mere electricity— in motion. Even the materialist's world contains a vast de more than this. Ask him where, in his scheme of things, h can find room for his love of his wife and children, his willin ness to risk his life for his country in war, his interest in scien and art and literature. All these things are not given hi from outside, they are parts of the life of a rational soul a its environment, acting and reacting upon each other. Wh we call reality is a construction which we make, chiefly unco sciously, out of very imperfect materials. We know that the are vast ranges of sound which none can hear, and many colou which we cannot see. The ultra-violet rays affect a phot graphic plate, but we cannot see them. 'The world,' 'earth 'things below,' as we have to call them, are an imaginative co struction like an impression of a tune played on a piano which half the notes are dumb.

If there is any general agreement about this very spec lative picture of a world, it is because most people have mu the same interests. They have to live in society, in a mo or less civilized community, and they surround themselves wi a world after their own likeness. To some it is an arena f fighting, to others a stage, to others a counting house; but the are pretty much on the same level. It is a picture of reali with God left out. This is 'the world,' of which the enemy souls is said to be the prince.

Now Christianity asserts that this is not the real world. is, as philosophers would say, an abstraction valid only for ce

ain purposes. If we try to live in it, if we 'mind earthly hings,' as St. Paul says, we shall find that nothing works out roperly. We aim at pleasure and miss it; we lay out clever chemes of living, and they all fail; we heap up the materials f happiness, and then destroy them in the mad frenzy of war. Man walketh in a vain shadow, and disquieteth himself in ain.' The results are what we might expect if there were ome very important blunder in our calculations.

What St. Paul calls the risen life is a life which does not ave God and the spiritual world out of account. It is a iew of the world which includes all that is best and holiest in uman experience. He says 'risen with Christ,' because it as Christ who, in a memorable phrase, 'brought life and im- ortality to light.' He made the sun shine on dark places of ur consciousness, illuminating a whole area of the real world hich had been only dimly visible before. It was He who aught us that God is Love. Our world is what we love; our ank in the scale of being depends on what we love; we only now what we love. The good Christian whose thoughts are onstantly turning to prayer and praise; who, in the beautiful ords of Tertullian, when he sees his brother sees his Lord; hose conversation, whose citizenship is in heaven—no far way heaven, but the presence of God, which is heaven—such man may truly be said to live in another world, in a different orld from the unspiritual man; but his world is, after all, only ie reality of the world in which we all live. He sees the eaning of the world; others do not.

I have tried to make these thoughts as plain as I can, and do not think they are really difficult. Is it not practically rtain that the miseries which have lately come upon the world e the results of a deplorable mistake about the nature and eaning of human life? Foolish people ask whether hristianity is not bankrupt. Obviously it is secularism which bankrupt. We can fancy our Lord weeping over Europe He wept over Jerusalem, 'If thou hadst known, at least in is thy day, the things that belong to thy peace, but now they e hid from thine eyes.' The power of the Resurrection, nich alone can save civilization, is just the call to the Risen ife, which is hid with Christ in God. It is said to be hidden, cause its springs are not manifest and cannot be fully dis-

played. Its source is in the unseen, the world of eter spiritual values which are as immortal as the mind of God wh thoughts they are. He who has so risen hath already pass from death unto life. St. Augustine thus describes his o experience, in words which still burn and glow from the pag

> 'I entered into the secret chamber of my soul, guided by Thee, entered, and beheld with the mysterious eye of my soul the light t never changes, above the eye of my soul, above my intelligence. was something altogether different from any earthly illumination. was it above my intelligence in the same way that oil is above wa or the sky above the earth; but it was higher because it made and I was lower because I was made by it. He who knows the tr knows that light, and he who knows that light knows eternity. L knows that light.'

THE CHURCH'S ATTITUDE TOWARD DIVORCED PERSONS

By Claud Mullins, Barrister-at-Law.

IT is no doubt very disconcerting to many sincere and ard Churchmen that problems about divorce should be perpe ally thrust upon them. It is easier, and certainly m pleasant, to ignore all such problems. Unfortunately divor like many kindred problems, cannot be ignored. Present c ditions are profoundly evil and, whatever be our view towa the problem of divorce, nobody can honestly find comfort the thought that by doing nothing we are avoiding evil con tions.

However, here I do not wish to enter at large upon t problem. It has been dealt with several times in the pages the *Modern Churchman*. I want to concentrate upon aspect of the problem only, namely, the attitude that Church should adopt to those who have been divorced. choose this point from among the many, first, because it vital to the Church and its relations with the State, secondly, because it is the only one upon which I am no agreement with the excellent report upon divorce drawn up 1919 by a Committee of the Churchmen's Union (*Mod Churchman*, November, 1919).

With the view of those who deny that there should be divorce in a Christian community it is futile to reason. L Halifax once declared at a meeting of the English Chu Union that 'for Christians the immorality of a man or a wom

who has husband or wife, living with somebody else is not condoned because the law of the land allows such relations.' In other words, there should be no divorce and, if the State allows divorce, the Church cannot serve either party to the divorce; both are sinners and beyond the ecclesiastical pale.

My purpose is to reason with those who, while disagreeing with these extreme, and to my mind unchristian, views, accept the comforting belief that the Church, in ministering to divorced persons, can distinguish between the innocent and the guilty party. The report accepted by the Churchmen's Union, explaining its attitude towards the extension of the grounds of divorce (a policy with which I am in general agreement), goes on to say (p. 391):

> 'So far we have been contemplating merely the case of the innocent party. With regard to the guilty party, we cannot recommend a clergyman to perform such a marriage in church. Such unions are not unions which the Church can reasonably be expected to bless.'

This view fully coincides with that of most liberal-minded churchmen. But, I submit, it is unsound, or rather inadequate.

In his evidence before the Royal Commission the present Bishop of Durham said that

> 'If the "guilty parties" were totally excluded from marriage in the parish churches, and the right of the innocent party to marry with the Church's blessing, were conditioned by an option to decline to officiate conferred on the clergyman, the practical grievance would be removed.'

Similar sentiments have recently been expressed by the Dean of St. Paul's in his contributions to the *Evening Standard*. I will accept the view that the Church should base its attitude towards divorced persons upon the decrees of the Courts of Law as to innocence and guilt. It is my purpose here to show that the Church should accept no such distinctions and that it is for the Church to ascertain for itself the degree of innocence or guilt, and to frame its actions accordingly.

May I give briefly four illustrations, three out of my own experience?

I. *The Times* of June 30th, 1919, published an autobiographical account of his divorce by Colonel J. C. Wedgwood, M.P. The following extract will suffice:

> 'The next stage was to get myself proved guilty of adultery. I chose the simplest way, took a suite of rooms at the —— Hotel, and took a lady there who was not my wife. As a matter of fact, there was no adultery there.'

Yet Colonel Wedgwood is the 'guilty' party as decided the Divorce Court.

II. *A*, a young air officer, married *B*, a girl of bad repu during the war. From my personal knowledge of *A* I a satisfied that his only matrimonial offence was contracting th marriage without adequate foresight. *A* has had it impress upon him that chivalry demands that he should free *B* a accept the blame. So *B* is divorcing *A* and the King's Proc is not likely to hear of anything detrimental to *B*. So *B* will the 'innocent' and *A* the 'guilty' party.

III. *A* is an officer in the Army. He married *B* in Ind when *B* was 20. They have lived in India ever since a have drifted apart. *B* is now petitioning to divorce *A*. T halo of the 'injured innocent' is being donned by *B*. Bu few years ago *B* told me casually that she was alwa trying to put attractive women in *A's* way in the hope that would fall. The Courts will pronounce *B* the 'innoce party.

IV. In a reported 'Society' divorce, *A* (a husba divorced *B* (his wife) in an undefended suit. About a y previously this case was in my own chambers with instructio to begin a suit for divorce in which *B* should divorce *A*. I w informed that the case would not be defended by *A*. I c not understand the delay until I saw the account of the ca with the boot on the other foot, in the newspapers. The h hand, who at one time agreed to let his wife divorce him, now the 'innocent' party.

The Courts and the King's Proctor do their best to prev collusion, but neither will ever be successful. And in ple of cases where there is no deliberate collusion, the moral g falls in quite different proportions from that apportioned by Courts. In fact Lord Halifax is so far right that to the Chu there are no 'innocent' divorced persons. It takes two make an unhappy marriage, and the decisions of the Divo Court as to innocence and guilt are often of necessity pur arbitrary.

If the Church is not going to bar rigidly all divorced p sons from its ministrations, let it not make the mistake of cepting the Courts' decrees about 'innocence' and 'guilt.' Su the best solution for the Church is to take its stand upon

individual facts and the attitude of the individuals themselves. Very few of the really guilty will trouble the Church for re-marriage or the Sacraments. But, I submit, the Church would be wrong either to assume that the 'innocent' parties to divorce suits are really innocent or that, because a husband or wife has been adjudged 'guilty,' he or she must automatically be debarred from the Church's assistance. The first attitude strikes me as being childish, the second as essentially unchristian. Every case surely should be dealt with on its merits, and the only person at all qualified to judge is the priest dealing with the divorced person.

At present no priest is compelled to re-marry a divorced person, but he cannot refuse the use of his church. What need is there to alter the law in this respect? Amendments have already been moved, and lost, to Lord Buckmaster's Bill to prevent any priest from re-marrying a divorced person. Such an attitude is intelligible, though I believe it to be mistaken. But I find difficulty in understanding the attitude of those who would, in effect, arbitrarily decree that the Church should accept the findings of the Law Courts. The Courts give their decisions on facts upon the evidence submitted; they are not courts of morals at all. The Church has a far higher standard than that which the Law Courts can ever hope to enforce, and the Church shirks its duty if it transforms legal decisions about facts into pronouncements about morals. The problem is essentially one of individuals, hence general rulings by ecclesiastical authority must be inadequate. The only solution which seems to me compatible with the Church's moral obligations and with its national functions is that no priest should be compelled to minister to divorced persons, but that every priest should be free to do so in any church. For the Church to separate divorced persons into innocent and guilty according to the decrees of the Courts would be to abrogate its spiritual functions. These cases should be decided, each on its own merits, as a matter of conscience between priest and parishioner and, if priests, in forming their decisions, pay as much attention, say, to the Beatitudes and I Corinthians, chapter 13, as to stray texts about divorce in the Gospel stories, then their judgement on these cases cannot greatly err.

THE REFORMATION—RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

By the Rev. R. Meiklejohn, B.D., LL.B.

WITH all its limitations, mediaeval religious thought was directed towards a very fine ideal. The Augustinian Civitas Dei was not merely the fleeting dream of a noble imaginative mind. It was the expression of a sane, practical idealism, the enunciation of an eminently reasonable and possible polity. In an age of barbaric confusions it pointed to the new world order. It looked away from the gross, ambitious, lustful, distracted kingdoms of the world to the perfect serenity of the Kingdom of God. It was directed from the Many to the One.

We may regret the actual historic form in which the Augustinian idea was expressed. We may see in the corruptions of the mediaeval Church, in the pretensions of the papacy, and its incessant conflict with the empire, little to remind us of the Kingdom of God. The theory of Augustine broke down in practice. It was inevitable that it should do so. The ideal unity and peace which he had contemplated was manifestly impossible, when the servant of the servants of God claimed, on the one hand, the feudal overlordship of the earth, and successive dynasties of bold and capable emperors maintained, on the other, the supremacy of their temporal power. And yet the idea of the Kingdom of God persisted; in other forms it survived the collapse of religious and political mediaevalism; it has persisted, even to the present day.

However lamentably deficient might be the mediaeval practice, there can be no doubt that in mediaeval theory the world-state *did* correspond, so closely as to be practically identical, with the world-Church. The Kingdom of God existed—on paper. From the coronation of Charles the Great till the burning of the papal bull by Luther, this conception of the identity of the kingdoms of the world with the Kingdom of God was implicit in European thought.

The growth of nationalities, however, as separate political entities, destroyed the conception of the world state or empire. Similarly, the development of a national religious mind de-

stroyed the conception of the Pope as the universal Father in God. The history of western Christendom is the history of the development, in each separate country, of a national consciousness. The rise of strong monarchies in the sixteenth century is symptomatic of this process. The king represents his people, and within his own dominions his supremacy is equally effective against Pope or Emperor. Universalism has broken down. Political and religious unity has been resolved, by force of circumstances, into its component parts. The world-state and the world-Church give way, at the Reformation, to individual nationalities, each with its own interpretation of religion. The '*cujus regio, ejus religio*' of the German princes—a maxim accepted and applied, indeed, by all the reforming princes—is an inevitable stage in political and religious development; but it is the antithesis of that ideal unity which Augustine shadowed forth. The One has been disintegrated into the Many.

But though Universalism in religion has thus been replaced by Nationalism, yet Sectarianism, and much less Individualism, are still unknown. Within the limits of the state, each citizen must conform to that interpretation of the Christian faith, and particularly to that form of ecclesiastical polity, accepted and sanctioned by the state. And normally no citizen was unwilling to accept this point of view. There might be, and were, differences of opinion as to what form of religious settlement should be imposed. In England, the Genevan discipline was strenuously asserted against the episcopacy of traditional Anglicanism. But the upholders of the conflicting systems had no doubt of the justification of imposing *their* particular settlement upon all citizens. There was no toleration of diversity of opinion. All who professed themselves Christians had to do so according to the current interpretation of Christianity. No one could stand outside the established religion of the land. 'Thus there arose National Churches, which were to be to the several Protestant countries of Europe that which the Church Catholic had been to the world at large; Churches, that is to say, each of which was to be co-extensive with its respective state, was to enjoy landed wealth and exclusive political privilege, and was to be armed with coercive power against recusants.'[1]

[1] Bryce, *Holy Roman Empire*, p. 378, and *passim*.

The Anglican Church after the Elizabethan settlement was just such a Church as is here described, and for that Church Richard Hooker is by far the greatest of contemporary apologists. For him the English Church was identical with the English nation. Its function was to comprehend and express English Christianity. 'There is not any member of the Commonwealth who is not also a member of the Church.' He argues emphatically against the Puritan contention that Commonwealth and Church are separate and distinct bodies. And indeed, although the mediaeval Church claimed for itself an exclusively spiritual basis—the Apostolate of Peter—the mediaeval theory of the identity of the world-Church with the world-state could not but influence the ideas which were developing in reformed countries. Just as in mediaeval theory 'Roman' and 'Catholic' had been interchangeable terms, the one expressing the civic, the other the religious side of a man's life, so in Hooker's thought, 'Englishman' and 'Churchman' were equally interchangeable terms. Each Englishman was at once a citizen and a churchman, the former by right of birth, the latter by admission in baptism. The Church *National*, then, indubitably part of the great visible Church of Christ; existing in this land from earliest times: governed by bishops whose rule was normal, historic, but certainly not *jure divino*; ancient yet reformed; with continuity yet with flexibility; basing upon Scripture its necessary faith, yet recognizing the human element in its growth; above all comprehensive of all Christian people: this was the theory of Anglicanism as expounded by Hooker.

The ideal of a comprehensive National Church was no sooner formulated than it was destroyed. The application of the coercive power of the state in the interests of uniformity made futile all efforts towards comprehension. It is true that in England uniformity in doctrine, government, and worship was more leniently interpreted, and less rigorously enforced, than in many other reformed countries; but it was upon the rock of uniformity that the good ship of Elizabethan Anglicanism shivered and split. The confessional theology of the time shows how precisely the theologians formulated their faiths, and how nice were their discriminations between orthodoxy and heterodoxy; the Inquisition, the Consistory, the

Court of High Commission were whips by which the doubtful starters among the faithful were compelled to toe the line of uniformity.

It is conceivably possible, however, that the sober common-sense of Englishmen might have mitigated the harshness of a compulsory uniformity and permitted a very real approximation to the comprehensive churchmanship of Hooker. Unfortunately, for polemical purposes, the Anglican bishops had forged a new weapon against the Presbyterians. The grounds upon which Hooker and the Reformation divines had defended Episcopacy were felt to be inadequate against the uncompromising claim of Geneva for the divine institution of Presbyterianism. The big gun of Geneva must be answered by the big gun at Canterbury. Bancroft's sermon at St. Paul's originates the theory of episcopacy *jure divino*, of government by bishops as of the *esse*, as well as of the *bene esse*, of the Church. No bishop, no Church, becomes the slogan of the high Anglicans. The Puritan begins to strike his tents. With the rise of Separatism, the Church Catholic has undergone a further process of disintegration. Nationalism in religion has been succeeded by Sectarianism.

There were hopes of accommodation in the opening years of the reign of James I, not so much with Rome (where the political difficulty, equally with the religious, constituted a fundamental and insuperable obstacle to re-union), but with the Puritans. Despite the enforcement of uniformity, and the development of the high Anglican theory of episcopacy, there was yet a hope of some concordat, whereby the conception of Hooker—the comprehensive English Church—might work itself out in practice and adjust itself to the ideas and circumstances of the age. But the failure of the Hampton Court Conference, the alliance between king and bishops, and the rapidly approaching constitutional struggle, made such a concordat impossible. The Puritans drifted further away from the National Church. Their sectarian tendencies increased, the more they espoused the cause of constitutional liberty against the Stuart kings. The Anglican episcopate, on the other hand, renewed their fatal and essentially Erastian allegiance to the king. The novel theory of 'divine right' superseded in the new Anglo-Catholic mind the old idea of papal

supremacy. Bancroftian episcopacy became the rule and not the exception; and Laud's fresh efforts after uniformity destroyed the last lingering traces of unity. The comprehensive National Church of the Elizabethan settlement disappeared in the clash of the Civil War, in the proscription of Anglicanism, in the failure of the Presbyterian system to replace it, and in the rise of innumerable independent sects. Some fifty years after Hooker's death, English Christianity was given over as a prey to the extremest forms of Individualism. The City of God was desecrated by the incessant bawling of the fanatics who trod its golden streets—'L'Eglise, c'est moi!'

The destructive process was carried a step further by the penal legislation of the Restoration. The well-intentioned effort at Comprehension, made at the Revolution, was a *constructive* attempt, which in the temper of the times was foredoomed to failure. The passing of the Toleration Act legalised schism, made permanent the disastrous divisions of English Christianity, and destroyed more effectually than the legislation of Charles II the unity of the National Church.

The prospective Reformation will be a reversal of the process which we have thus briefly sketched. It will be formative, constructive, synthetic. It will seek once more to give expression to English Christianity as a whole. It will be animated by ideals of religious unity wider than mere Anglicanism. The League of Nations will find its counterpart in the League of Churches. This is but a little step upon the road. The idea of the City of God will dominate men's minds afresh, and in the new world-state which is coming they will seek once more to build the new world-Church. The ideal of mediaevalism and modernism is essentially the same. It is the method only that differs.

The English Reformation of the immediate future will have for its object the bridging of the hitherto impassable gulfs which have divided English Christians one from another. Church reform, like innumerable other things, must begin at home. It is useless to turn fond eyes beyond the seas until we have consolidated the position within our own national boundaries. We must slowly and with infinite patience retrace our steps, until out of the individualism and sectarianism of

present English Christianity we return to the national, comprehensive Church of the Elizabethan divines. This must be the *terminus ad quem*, the primary objective of all present day efforts towards re-union. The Church must be made fully and completely representative of English religious life. Within it there must be embodied and consecrated the manifold diversities of gifts which English Christianity has to offer to the service of Christ and humanity. Only thus can the Church of England become in reality what it is now only in name—the Church of the English people.

Calvinism and Laudianism, which between them split the English Church, were both systems framed in the interests of strict theological and ritual uniformity. Uniformity, whatever it may be designed to effect, ultimately operates exclusively rather than inclusively. Its inevitable tendency is to drive men out of the Church rather than to comprehend them within it. The modern tendency, which is as old indeed as the school of Falkland and the Cambridge Platonists, is to relegate uniformity into a position of comparative obscurity, and to reconstruct the Church upon the simpler basis of unity of belief and Christian effort; and it is along the lines of the Latitudinarian divines—the epithet is honourable rather than reproachful—that the Reformers of the twentieth century will have to proceed.

The Cambridge Platonists, removed, in their academic seclusion, from the strife of tongues, convinced of the futility of the methods of existing systems, were resolved to commence *de novo*. The mediaevalists—and the Westminster divines and the high Anglicans were equally mediaeval in their emphasis upon uniformity—had reversed the normal method of approaching their subject. The old school had asked: What constitutes an orthodox belief and a true Church? The new school asked: In what does the Christian religion consist? What is essential and what is accidental to Christianity? These were the fundamental problems which had to be solved before the idea of the Church as a society of religious men could be evolved.

To the Cambridge Platonists, the Christian religion meant simply the Christian life. It was 'universal righteousness'; 'the good mind and the good life, reforming a man's temper

and governing his practice'; 'the being as much like God as man can be like Him.' To this school the method of approach to problems of doctrine was through the experiences of the Christian life. *Solvuntur ambulando.* It was also, incidentally, the method of the Founder of Christianity. 'If any man will do God's will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself.' That Christianity was a very real way of living, a practice rather than a theory, was the substance of the teaching of this Cambridge school. Their tendency was mystical rather than institutional. They dwelt more upon the inwardness of religion than on its external organisation in a Church, or its dogmatic expression in a creed. In their conception of Christianity, creeds, rituals, polities, are of secondary importance. Since varieties of opinion are inevitable, they are to be tolerated, and even welcomed, as an indication of a quickened interest in religion. But they must be recognised as the changing forms in which unchangeable truth is expressed. Such doctrinal basis of union as is necessary may be found in the simplest of credal symbols—that of the Apostles, so called. Beyond this there must be latitude for the free expression of opinion. 'Determinations beyond Scripture have indeed enlarged faith, but lessened charity and multiplied divisions.' The Church, therefore, for them, as for Hooker, is not a separate society with exclusive shibboleths, but the whole body of Christian men, the nation in its religious aspect. But what is now cherished is not uniformity of doctrine or government, but unity of spiritual life and endeavour. The Cambridge Platonists approximate more closely than any other of the seventeenth century divines to the Prayer Book definitions of the Church: 'a congregation of faithful men,' 'all they that do confess Thy holy Name,' 'all who profess and call themselves Christians.' They sought to restore that comprehensiveness which was the glory of the Elizabethan settlement, and which had been destroyed by attempted uniformity, either in the interests of Canterbury or Geneva.

For the rest, they were deeply attached to traditional Anglicanism. They delighted in its 'virtuous mediocrity' as distinguished from 'the meretricious gaudiness of the Church of Rome and the squalid sluttery of fanatic conventicles.' They loved its liturgy. They venerated its form of government, pre-

ferring the episcopal to any other type of discipline, but on its merits and not because of its alleged divine institution.

It is, we believe, along these lines and by this method that English Christianity will find its normal expression. The ideal of the seventeenth century, wearied by the unceasing animosities of conflicting sects, was Toleration. The ideal of the twentieth century will be Comprehension. There will be no one outside the great Church of England, save only Jews, Turks, heretics, and infidels. Probably the heretic, perhaps even the infidel, of the seventeenth century will be reckoned among the orthodox of the twentieth . . . And then we shall turn our gaze to lands beyond the seas, to the larger unity which shall be international, to the world-Church of the new Reformation. We must be patient a little longer of ecclesiasticism, sacerdotalism, obscurantism, particularism, ultramontanism—of all the other 'isms' which men yet mistake for the Christianity of Christ. Gradually the rubble will be cleared away, and on the unencumbered site will rise the new City of God.

CHRIST THE SEER

MR. Gamble, in his article, 'The Christ of History,' gives us our choice between a Didactic Christ, an Eschatological Christ, and a Mythical Christ. I myself refuse to chose any of these, but he chooses the Eschatological Christ, and I write now to state, as clearly as I can, what seem to me to be the results of that choice.

The Eschatological Christ is one who believed something that was not true, and Whose whole teaching arose out of that belief. For instance, He said, 'Take no thought for the morrow,' because He believed that there was not going to be any morrow. Mr. Gamble, and many others, admit this.

> 'His central message is a summons to leave the grooves of tradition and current usage in the presence of an impending convulsion. Many of His utterances are coloured by the imminence of radical, searching change. He does not formulate laws for coming generations. He sees the immediate approach of a new heaven and a new earth.'

But the convulsion did not come, the change did not happen;

Christ said, in the Sermon on the Mount and elsewhere, tha men should live in a certain way; but His reasons for sayin this were false ones, and now we know that they were false Mr. Gamble himself asks: 'Was He who spoke as neve man spoke a deluded prophet?' He says that he does no like the expression because it suggests credulity or weakness o mind; but his view implies credulity and weakness of mind his apology for Christ and His delusion is only an apology and a poor one.

> 'I will at once admit that the mind of Christ moved along th lines traced by His age and country. I do not see how any othe mental structure would have made it possible for Him to fulfil Hi mission or indeed would have been consistent with humanity. If H had thought and spoken according to the form of any subsequent ag He would have been unintelligible to His own age.'

This means that, because a great number of Jews then held false, and, indeed mischievous, belief, Christ was bound t hold it. Unless He said what was not true, He could not fulfi His mission. But what, according to Mr. Gamble, was Hi mission? Merely to preach something that was not true; an certainly, if His mission was to preach something untrue, H could not fulfil it except by preaching that. But, in that case why are any of us Christians now? We do not believe wha Christ believed; and, if we are inclined to do any of the thing He told us to do, it is not for the reasons He gave. But wh must the mind of Christ have moved along the lines traced b his age and country? We call some men men of genius be cause their minds do not move along the lines so traced, bu along lines of their own. If Galileo's mind had moved alon the lines traced by his age and country, he would have believe that the sun went around the earth. If Christ was impelled t believe an untruth because the Pharisees believed it, then H was not even a man of genius; and it is hard to understan why He was so bitterly opposed to the Pharisees, or they t Him. It is always the mark of a man of genius that he speak according to the forms of a subsequent age, because it is th men of genius who make those forms. Men of genius ar commonly unintelligible to their own age; and, even accord ing to Mr. Gamble's view, Christ has remained unintelligibl for nineteen centuries, at least he admits that we are still dis

puting what He meant. Finally he makes this strange and nconsistent remark :

> ' Moreover, the Gospels make it clear that He claimed no knowledge of the time of any future event.'

But his Christ did claim to know that a convulsion, a change, a new heaven and a new earth were coming immediately; and hey did not come. To this Christ, Mr. Gamble says, ' we ake the place of pupils in the presence of a master.' Yet we know that He taught what was untrue. ' We do not prescribe o God how He shall accomplish His designs. We observe how He has accomplished them.' But what has God accomplished? A prophet came into the world, prophesied something that did not happen, died, and founded a religion which soon was forced to give up His main belief because it was proved to be false, and which now persists for reasons which would have seemed to Him irrelevant. If this was the lesign of God, then we may say that anything that happens s His design; whatever is is right.

Mr. Gamble holds that all which now seems to us the essence of Christianity was but a fortunate bye-product of Christ's own delusion.

> ' His message is contained in the sharp call to repent, to come out of a doomed world, to put off its livery, to return its wages. In uttering this call He does incidentally teach, and put forth many fruitful sayings, many vivid illustrations. But the teaching is subsidiary to the call.'

Yet the world was not doomed, and, if the sayings were fruitful the call itself was barren. The Church, according to Mr. Gamble, gradually discovered by experience that Christ Himself had been wrong about the Kingdom of Heaven; He did not know what it was, but the Church found out.

> ' The disciples found in spiritual experience the Kingdom which they had at first pictured as something exclusively future. They owned the spiritual presence of Christ in their midst, while they continued to look for His future bodily advent. All this took place in the stillness created by the call of Christ to come out of the doomed world.'

But that stillness was the result of a delusion; the truth, n so far as the disciples grasped it at all, was the bye-product f error. The Church gradually became more and more right; in this detachment the distinctively Christian values were settled,' but Christ Himself, unlike the later Church, had been

wrong; the distinctively Christian values had not been His; His values were all based upon a future event that never happened. In fact his Christianity was not ours.

This view, I confess, seems to me as absurd as the Baconian theory; the Church is the Bacon of the eschatologists and, just as Shakespeare did not write his own plays, so Christ did not believe his own religion; all those sayings and actions of His, because of which we are Christians, had a meaning, a motive, which we must ignore. But what possible connection is there between the Eschatological Christ and the most Christian sayings and actions of Christ? What have the parables of the Prodigal Son or the Good Samaritan, what has the saying: 'Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do?' to do with an impending convulsion? How can it be said of this convulsion that it is within, or among, you; or that it is like leaven or a grain of mustard seed, or the good seed which a man sowed in his field. And why, when the whole teaching of Christ was proved, by the mere lapse of time, to have been founded on a delusion, did the Church continue and increase?

That is a question the believers in the Eschatological Christ cannot answer; nor can the believers in a Didactic Christ or a Mythical Christ; and that is why, as I said to start with, I will not accept any of these. There must be some explanation in Christ Himself, in the real Christ, of the spread of Christianity. Mr. Gamble cannot find it there, except that he thinks Christ got conviction and power from His belief in an immediate convulsion. He, like many others, is unable to find any meaning in the doctrine of the Kingdom of Heaven but that. The Gospels tell us, he says, that His ministry had, as its centre or its fulcrum, the announcement that the Kingdom of God was at hand.

> 'It is to me incredible that He should have meant by this announcement only that the sovereignty of God was about to reassert itself, that some important change was about to take place in the ethical notions of mankind.'

In fact for him there is no alternative to the Eschatological Christ except a kind of Positivist Christ, who meant by the Kingdom of Heaven what Comte meant by rational behaviour. But how if Christ was a seer, a visionary in the true sense of the word, One Who saw a reality that other men do not see, and Who gave the name, the Kingdom of Heaven, to that reality?

If that were so, it would account for his power over men both while He lived and for thousands of years after, and also for the fact that even those who were most moved by Him did not fully understand Him. In fact besides the Didactic, the Mythical, and the Eschatological Christ, there is the Prophetic, the Mystical, Christ, who is not changed or injured by modern research any more than a great artist is so changed or injured. There is in the words of Christ, in His reported actions, a power which still we do not understand, because He was telling men of the reality He saw, trying to make them see that reality, in the necessarily imperfect medium of words. So the great musicians tell us of reality; and still we are moved by their music, though we cannot understand all that it means. But He spoke, acted, and lived, that reality, which is not His alone, His secret or patent, but is the theme of all great visionaries. That is why its power persists, and why the Christian religion persists. If Christ had been a deluded fakir, either it would have died long ago, or else the whole universe is nonsense.

A. Clutton-Brock.

BOOK NOTICES

SELF AND NEIGHBOUR.*

It is a pleasure to review a real book on Moral Philosophy, a book in which the moral problem is treated seriously for its own sake. The writer is, indeed, largely occupied with the relations of his subject both to Psychology and to Metaphysic, but he does not resolve Ethics into an inquiry into the historical (or pre-historic) origin of Morality, nor on the other hand does he treat Moral Philosophy as a subject which, so far as it is not Metaphysic, may be dismissed with some contempt as little more than a kind of preaching. Mr. Hirst's book is an able and serious contribution to a serious subject.

The writer begins with criticism. He has good chapters upon 'Egoism,' 'Universalistic Hedonism,' 'Perceptual Intuitionism,' 'The Kantian Ethic,' Hume, Spencer, and the ancient Moralists. In his exploration of previous systems he finds no rest for the sole of his foot till he comes to the doctrine of the 'common good,' and yet he is alive to the difficulties which that theory presents in the form given to it by T. H. Green. He recognizes the fundamental inconsistency between Green's doctrine that desire is always the desire of personal good (though not of personal pleasure) and his attempt to make out that the true good is 'common.' The main object of Mr. Hirst's book is to interpret better and to place on

**Self and Neighbour. An Ethical Study.* By Edward W. Hirst, M.A. (Lond.), B.Sc. (Oxon). Macmillan and Co., London, 1914.

a firmer foundation the doctrine that Morality consists in the pursuit of a 'common good.'

By the 'common good' he does not of course mean merely the general good; he means a good which is strictly 'common'—not my good or my neighbour's exclusively, but something which is equally good for me and for all my neighbours. '"Good" must mean the same thing for each and all. Moreover, the good of one must be consistent with the good of each and all, and even imply it. Good must be such that no one can seek it for himself without thereby seeking it for his neighbour. In short, Good must be "common"; or, as Mr. Hirst prefers to say, it must be "community."' This goodness is of universal application, because primarily it means the spiritual unity of mankind. Mr. Hirst readily admits, as Green did not so consistently admit, that no good can with any plausibility be represented as 'common' in this sense except moral goodness, and the only kind of moral goodness that can really be common is devotion to the good of one's fellows. The common good is, in short, love. This view has (as Mr. Hirst acknowledges) much in common with Royce's theory of the 'beloved community'—the community consisting of all persons who love one another and whose supreme object it is to make other men into lovers. But he quarrels with Royce's Absolutist or (as Mr. Hirst calls it) 'Singularist' Metaphysic. He contends, indeed, that the ethical datum of a common good demands for its establishment a Metaphysic which recognizes not merely a community but a certain identity of nature between each man and all his neighbours. And yet he sees very clearly, as writers like Green and even the Archbishop of Armagh have not seen, that a doctrine which resolves Morality into Love cannot afford to play fast and loose with the idea of human personality. If the Universe is the only reality, and individuals are mere 'appearances,' the true end must be the end of the Universe and not a good which consists in a relation between finite persons. 'Supposing the good of the Universe to be the absolute ethical end, this would appear to make Good Singular and Sole, and not Common. Goodness in such a case would belong to some transcendent cosmic principle, and it would therefore be unique. Once make the Absolute Good teleological and cosmic, that to which, as D'Arcy says, the whole course of Nature is relative, and to which not only men but also God is contributory, then there can be only one example of such good, as it must be presented by the Universe, or whatever is equivalent or representative of it. Morality as ordinarily conceived is no longer possible. . . . If only the Universe can be "good," then both God and man are merely instruments for the realization of such good, whatever it may be' (p. 108).

'Absolute Idealism is solipsistic' (p. 185). There is much excellent criticism on this attitude both in the disguised form which it assumes in Green and Archbishop D'Arcy, and in the more uncompromisingly anti-ethical form which (in spite of all his practical sympathy with the moral life) it takes on in the teaching of Prof. Bosanquet. How does Mr. Hirst think that he escapes these and other difficulties of which he shows himself fully appreciative? In the first place there is the difficulty of making the individual pursue his own good and yet representing that good as something which is not purely personal but common. This he thinks he avoids by holding that it is not some good state either of self or of another or both that is pursued but just the fact of the community. 'The phrase "Common Good" is misleading and badly chosen. The good must consist of this very inter-personal activity itself. It is not "good" which is common, but "community" which is good' (p. 119); and he traces the difficulty in which the Absolutists have involved themselves largely to their excessive intellectualism. It is not in the possession of a reason which

in so far as it is 'common' does not seem to recognize the distinction of persons at all, but love which is the true good, and 'the essence of ethical love or of what we have called "community" is that it is "inter-personal" not merely in its relation, for even hate is that, but "inter-personal" also in its interest' (p. 121). 'The object of the "ego's" desire is the joint good of self and neighbour in such wise that there is no subordination of one to the other, but an identification of interests' (p. 122). It appears to me that, so far as the good is really the good of two persons, it is not really the same good, and therefore not 'common.' A's love for B is not really B's good, though its consequences may be so; and if the love is reciprocated, B's love for A is not the same love as A's love for B. And in so far as the good is not a good enjoyed by A or B. but '*inter*-personal,' so far as it is simply the abstract 'community,' the relation between them, the good is no longer personal at all; and Mr. Hirst is back again in the difficulty which he points out in the Absolutists. The good hangs somewhere between A and B; it may conceivably be thought of as the good of the Universe, but it is not that of any definite person or persons, and is therefore not 'common.'

Then Mr. Hirst has to face a metaphysical difficulty which he thinks is fatal to the doctrine of the common good in its Absolutist form. He seems to think that the obligation of Morality can only be maintained by making out the good which the moral man pursues to be equally his and his neighbour's, so that in loving his neighbour he is really loving himself; and yet he insists strongly upon the fact that the love which according to him is in this position is 'inter-personal.' How does he reconcile the two positions?

I find it difficult to select a passage which briefly expresses Mr. Hirst's view in a summary fashion. I can only say that he tries very hard to tread the razor-edge that divides the Absolutism he wishes to avoid from his own view which seeks to rationalize Altruism by insisting on a community between man and man and between God and man without making either unreal or swallowing up either into a unity which 'transcends' the difference between them. 'A Self that "includes" all other selves really annihilates them; an Experience that embraces other experiences virtually negates them. . . . My own consciousness cannot be a part of another person's consciousness' (pp. 187-8). 'There can be no love, in any intelligible sense of the term, between the parts of the same organism' (p. 192). So far I follow entirely. And yet Mr. Hirst holds that 'it is the duty of the individual to promote the good of society, because to do so is to promote his own, and he cannot promote his own save as he promotes the good of others' (p. 199). 'It is sufficient for our purpose that this system of experients with their experiences should be acknowledged to depend upon a supreme experient, whose "experience" in some way such a system is.' The ice seems to me here to become remarkably thin: the author is getting back to just the Absolutism which he condemns; a 'system of experients' is not a person capable of enjoying a personal good. In his further attempts to steer a course between such an identification of self and neighbour (or God) as will destroy love and the admission that after all my good is one thing and my neighbour's is another thing, he sometimes falls back upon that blessed word 'solidarity'—a favourite word of all embarassed system-makers. Mr. Hirst's theory seems to represent an attempt to find a half-way house between 'mine' and 'not mine.'

I have not space to reproduce the argument by which Mr. Hirst establishes the necessity of Theism to a sound theory of Moral Obligation. I have nothing to say against Mr. Hirst's Theology in itself (if I put aside

his attempt to avoid the difficulties of 'creation' by adopting the orthodox theory that time and the world were created together); and his criticism on Absolutism, in spite of all that has recently been written on the subject, are often vigorous and original. But to my mind his Theology does not help Mr. Hirst to make out his fundamental doctrine that there can be such a thing as a common good. It is true that Love is a good, and the lover *promotes* his neighbour's good. But the good that he promotes must be some other good than the good which consists in the lover's love. No doubt part, *and the highest part*, of the good which I ought to promote for my neighbour is that he too should become a lover of his neighbour: but my neighbour's love for me is not the same thing as my love for him. Moreover, till we have discovered something which is good other than the good-will, we can discover no content for that will: we do not emerge from the difficulty which is commonly recognized in the Kantian Ethics. Once admit that there is some other good for my neighbour besides love, *e.g.* happiness, and then I may recognize that the love which promotes happiness is better than the happiness that it promotes. If my neighbour's happiness is not intrinsically good,—a better and more valuable thing than his misery, why should love show itself in making him happy? All Mr. Hirst's attempts to answer this question seem to me quite unsuccessful. Moral goodness seems to be connected with the promotion of non-moral goods in some quite arbitrary and inexplicable manner. And the difficulty is not overcome by Mr. Hirst's attempt to found duty upon a community of nature whether between man and man or between man and God through the common relation to God. Some who have held that doctrine (*e.g.* Spinoza) pushed it to its logical consequences by denying that there was anything wrong in cruelty to animals, and popular Roman Catholicism adopts the same point of view when a Southern Italian justifies cruelty to his donkey by pleading that animals have no souls. I wonder whether Mr. Hirst would accept this view, or does he think that there is sufficient community of nature with the lower animals to establish our duty towards them? For my own part I should hold that my duty to another conscious being depends not upon the extent to which I may be like him or unlike him, but upon the value of some kind of consciousness in that being: to say that consciousness is good is in fact to say that it is a duty (if I can do so without greater loss of good) to promote it. I quite recognize with Mr. Hirst the necessity of Theism to justify *fully and satisfactorily* the objectivity which our moral consciousness claims for moral distinctions, but to my mind Mr. Hirst makes Morality too much or too exclusively dependent upon Religion. 'Neighbour must be loved as self must be loved; and self must be loved not as a monad, but as the child of the Heavenly Father . . . 'It is this fundamental and essential unity of all men in God which is the rationale of love' (p. 234). I should say, rather, neighbour must be loved because he possesses intrinsic value; and no doubt that which in him has most value, is due to the fact that he is the 'child' of his Heavenly Father, to his sharing (to some extent) what is most valuable in the life of God. But, if I were satisfied that the idea of a 'Heavenly Father' was the illegitimate creation of a mythopœic imagination, I should still think a duty to promote my neighbour's good, though in an irrational Universe Morality could not possess the objectivity—that can be claimed for it in a Universe which is the expression of a supreme Mind.

Though Mr. Hirst's treatise is eminently in the best sense of the word a scientific treatment of Ethics in general, and not a discussion of practical details, he has some excellent remarks on the practical applications of his principles. His ideal of life is profoundly Christian: and his Christianity is sane and modern—not at all medieval and quite free from the kind of

Mysticism which the doctrine of a 'common good' might possibly suggest. Nevertheless there do seem to be some deficiencies in his ideal which are connected (whether as cause or effect) with his theoretical position. He so completely resolves Morality into Love that he has no place at all for self-regarding duties. No knowledge, no intellectual or aesthetic self-culture, except in so far as they tend to promote someone else's good, would seem to have any value at all. He seems disposed to admit that a ship-wrecked mariner thrown upon a desert island without hope of rejoining his kind would have no duties at all. So far as appears, he would be at liberty to drink himself to death on the last cask of whiskey which was saved from the wreck, or to indulge in any other vice (commonly so called) which could be practised in solitude.

Mr. Hirst is kind enough frequently to adopt views and to quote passages of mine; on other points, *e.g.* as in my to him too rationalistic view of Conscience, he devotes considerable space to criticizing me. I could not have adequately replied to these criticisms consistently with doing justice to Mr. Hirst's main argument. So I will only say that they seem to me (as criticisms usually do to the criticized) to be largely based on misunderstanding. I will conclude by saying that the work is deserving of most attentive study, and that I recognize in Mr. Hirst's *Self and Neighbour* a very serious piece of philosophical thinking.

H. Rashdall.

ANTONIO FOGAZZARO.*

When Pius IX was asked to write a preface to a forthcoming religious work, he is said to have answered that, though custom made this impossible, he could do what would ensure it an even larger sale; he could place it on the Index. *The Life of Fogazzaro* has higher claims to attention than its condemnation by the Inquisition. As a biography, it stands in the first rank; as a psychological study, and as literary criticism, it is a work of exceptional distinction. But it is probable that its condemnation has made it what it is, the last new thing in Italy; and contributed to its phenomenal sale. For even devout Catholics have ceased to take the Inquisition very seriously. A religious applied to his superior for permission to read a prohibited book. 'At Rome it is impossible,' was the reply; 'go to Frascati, and read it there.'

The author, himself a writer of distinction, has rightly given us not a eulogy, but a life-study of his friend. The book is 'the history of a soul'; and he describes it as 'a call to inwardness, addressed to a generation which lives increasingly on the surface of things.' If Fogazzaro fell short of genius, he possessed a singular combination of talent and charm. His temperament was one of extreme sensibility: his imagination, his nerves, his senses, were too susceptible for rest and equilibrium; he wandered, not between two, but many worlds. His life was 'the intimate tragedy of a soul in search of God'; but one, at least, of the causes of his unrest was the facility with which he contracted a succession of friendships into which, platonic as they were, the element of sex entered, and which a friendly critic describes as *tepidi adulteri spirituali*. The oscillation between the ardours of sense and spirit is common; and the ineffectualness of the former accounts for his persistent mystic disquietude, and for the minor key in which his art is set. The religious

**La Vita di Antonio Fogazzaro.* By Tommaso Gallarati-Scotti. Milano: Casa Editrice, Baldini and Castaldi, 1920. Lire 12.

tradition in which he was trained was that of Rosmini, still a power for good in Lombardy. This remained the foundation; what was added was superstructure, and relative to the changed circumstances of his time. There could have been no better or more solid foundation. The Rosminian school united religion with patriotism, and both with learning. It was sincerely Catholic, venerating the Papacy both as the centre of unity, and as the historical inheritance of Italy. But it set itself against the Temporalism of the Curia, its spirit of intrigue, its narrow moral and intellectual horizons; it desired a spiritual religion, a learned priesthood, an Apostolic Pope. A Rosminian, then, had little to unlearn; and, though Fogazzaro's faith went through a period of eclipse, this was shortlived; and, when he emerged, his religion was neither a convention nor a problem, but a passion; he was possessed by 'the nostalgia of God.' He lived, like Goethe, *im Ganzen*: for him the same life pulsated in man and in Nature; he thrilled at the consciousness of the kinship of the rational and the irrational creations; he saw the marvel of the universe with the eyes of the writer of the *Benedicite*, or of the Franciscan Canticle of the Sun. It was on those mystical, rather than directly scientific, lines, that he approached the question of Evolution, on which (1891) he first came into conflict with popular and official theology; and the key to his attitude in this and in the other controversies with which his name was subsequently associated is that they presented themselves to him primarily as religious, and only secondarily as critical and historical. He was inclined to press this distinction to a point at which it broke down: but, if it is remembered that he was all along rather a Liberal Catholic than what was afterwards called a Modernist, the reproach of half-heartedness, which was brought against him by orthodox and heterodox alike, loses much of its sting.

He approached art as a vocation, and came to it as a priest to his shrine. With him its form was that of self-expression. His novels are fragments of autobiography in which the writer appears and re-appears as Silla, as Daniele, as Maironi: 'Each is in turn a moment in an interior romance, that of his own life; a confession, opening with Malombra and closing thirty years later with Leila, in which he records his loves and his sufferings, his most intimate relations with women, his highest aspirations to God.' After the intense effort of the Risorgimento, Italy was the victim of a reaction not unlike that in which England finds itself to-day. There was a general lowering of standards: political and financial adventurers, journalists on the make, lawyers set on promotion, replaced men of the type of Garibaldi, Mazzini and Cavour. Here, he saw, was the enemy. Theology was powerless against it; his aim was to unite the ideal elements in the nation, of which the Church, he believed, might still be one, in the holy war. In this connection the sketches of Cardinal Capecelatro, 'the last of the Guelfs'; of Bishop Bonomelli, 'the embodiment of the union between religion and patriotism'; and of Leo XIII, who stood in the line of the greater Popes, are illuminating. Without being Modernists—Modernism was not of their age—they were men of open mind and large heart. Save in rare instances, 'a mysterious law seems to exclude such characters from the hierarchy'; were this not so, the prospects of the Churches would be brighter than they are. Nor should such portraits as that of Carducci, 'a rude, virile, but honest enemy of Christianity'; of d'Annunzio, 'who can neither love nor suffer'; of Pascoli, 'whom Dante would have placed in the Limbus Infantium,' be forgotten. Their lines are few: but the object is rendered to the life.

As a controversialist, Fogazzaro was, in a sense, an amateur. But no professional theologian had his power of expression. It is probable

that *Il Santo* made more converts to Modernism than the scientific works of M. Loisy; it spoke to men and women in their own tongue. And it echoed their varying moods, to which the self-contained austerity of the critic is foreign, and in which two divergent lines of thought lie side by side unreconciled—impatience of, and submission to, authority; neither by Fogazzaro, nor by his biographer, is the question of the legitimacy of the authority or of its demands raised. No one will charge the author of this *Life* with compromising principle; like a *quondam* duellist, he has given his proofs. But a Catholic, who is so more than in name, must come to some sort of terms with the Pontifical Acts of 1907; and he can only do so either by extenuating these pronouncements, or by throwing the responsibility for them on those against whom they were directed. The apology here offered for the Encyclical *Pascendi* is that it 're-affirmed the realistic dualism which is of the essence of Christianity'—the author is silent as to the vast superstructure of untruth raised on this speculative foundation; and that it 'brought to light the superficiality and insincerity which, particularly in Italy, was undermining religion'—a point on which the Pope and his advisers might well have begun at home. The grievance of the new Concordist school against Modernism appears to be that the Modernists were not saints. They were not; but they were better and more honest men than their opponents; and of the policy of pacifism which it is thought that they should have adopted, it is enough to say that, were it carried out in human affairs, society would be the prey of the criminal classes: when bad men conspire, good men must combine. The reproach of 'intellectualism' is unconvincing. The propositions condemned by Pius X are, no doubt, in themselves morally indifferent. But it is another thing when we are called upon to assent to those condemnations as embodying truths of faith, and as imposed under anathema. This is not a thing morally indifferent; the dilemma in which Loisy and Tyrrell found themselves was that they had to choose between excommunication and a lie. To speak of their 'gradual withering,' and of 'the ice of a dissolving intellectualism' is as easy as it is futile: human nature is human nature, and Modernists are men. Fogazzaro saw more truly, and spoke more wisely, when he said that, had the prudence and charity of Leo XIII been inherited by his successor, these distinguished men would not have been lost to the Church.

It was, however, less to the tyranny of the Vatican than to the indifference of public opinion to the whole subject that the collapse of 1907—8 was due. This was the Achilles' heel of Modernism, as it had been of Liberal Catholicism, of Jansenism, of the Reformation in the Latin countries, and of every effort to reform Catholicism from within. Success, immediate success at least, is with the violent. The Papacy was strongly entrenched in the existing social order; the reformers were few; *l'homme moyen sensuel* was frankly not interested—'Hippokleides did'nt care.' And individuals in conflict with an institution are, and appear, at a disadvantage: the dice are loaded, and can only fall one way.

And now the world in which Modernism played its brief part is shattered: all things are become new. The movement was, it is true, *una crisi non risolta*—'a crisis of thought and feeling, of doubt and disquietude, not resolved.' But the next stage of the religious synthesis, now overdue, must subsume it; for facts are facts: nor can we expect it to come to us faultless and from heaven; for the human vehicle is human, and the Divine light never descends unclothed. We in this country shall do well to learn from the vicissitudes of other Churches. For we are no better than our neighbours, though we are apt to think ourselves so; and, when the ship of Peter is in perils by water, the lesser barque of the

Church of England must go warily, if it is to weather the storm. Neither the baser elements of religion which came to the front under Pius X, nor their representatives, are wanting among us; though, as the field open to them is insular not European, their activities are restricted and their personalities on a smaller scale. ALFRED FAWKES.

THE FINALITY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.*

'To live any longer upon the moral reserves of Christianity without solidly establishing its claim to finality has become impossible,' writes Mr. Bouquet; and it is true that the uncritical respect for Christian ethics which the Victorians combined with a hardly less uncritical contempt for theology, is no longer possible. Compromise is an excellent thing, until some troubler of Israel, like the prophet Nietzsche, comes with his trenchant criticisms, and gives men the choice between two alternatives.

The 'finality' of Christianity is, then, the problem. But what do we mean by 'Christianity'? Mr. Bouquet does not evade the question, but faces it in his Introduction, where he condemns the following 'subtle suggestions':

(1) That because Christ's humanity was real and not artificial He was therefore a Preacher rather than an Actor, and that His message was divine rather than His Personality.

(2) That the essence of Christianity lies in values rather than in facts.

(3) That the enunciation of such values is only of relative and not of absolute importance, and that there may yet be a new revelation.

(4) That God does not act in History.

These four propositions are only formulated to be condemned: 'This fourfold contention is the real enemy of Christianity.' It seems to us that the four are not quite on a level. The last certainly deserves Mr. Bouquet's censure; the third is a little ambiguous; the second is Ritschlianism, the first Liberal Protestantism. And without endorsing any of these 'heresies,' one would feel that to describe them, and not materialism or non-religion, as 'the real enemy' is a little too emphatic. One knows that to an orthodox believer atheism sometimes seems less offensive than heresy, and the Mediaeval Church certainly preferred Mohammedans to Albigenses, while a Pagan has always been greater in the Kingdom of Heaven than an Arian; still, one feels that Mr. Bouquet's condemnation is a little too strong.

As a contrast to these four heresies we have, on the previous page, a formulation, in three propositions, of the principles of genuine Christianity:

(*a*) The Revelation of Jesus as the Revelation of God in Action.

(*b*) Christianity as a religion of Historical Fact.

(*c*) Christ as in some sense Absolute.

We have no fault whatever to find with these.

Mr. Bouquet quietly puts on one side the whole question of the miraculous, for several reasons, but especially because 'the essential basis of Christian faith is belief and trust in a Personal God . . . all life is an expression of the free creative guidance of Personality. All is natural and all is supernatural. There is but one order, not two.'

These preliminary remarks, which have absorbed most of our space, serve to indicate what type of Christianity it is that Mr. Bouquet believes will prove final. His belief in the finality of Christianity means that:

**Is Christianity the Final Religion?* By Alan Coates Bouquet, B.D. Macmillans, 10/6 net.

'That interpretation of all history is the true one which makes the career of Jesus of Nazareth the moral and spiritual climax in the annals of this planet, and arranges all other events around it.'

Yet change, or rather development, are not excluded: 'This absolute character of our religion has not prevented it from undergoing in the past the most revolutionary changes of expression, and therefore we must be prepared for the possible advent of no less revolutionary changes in the future.'

A perusal of Mr. Bouquet's chapters has inspired the reflection whether, after all, there may not be two more or less contradictory types of theologian, just as there always have been, and always will be, two types of philosopher, and no more. As the latter can be divided into Platonists and Aristotelians, perhaps the former can be classified into those who concentrate upon 'events of history,' and those for whom 'events of history' are irrelevant. It has been suggested that these two types of theology are characteristic of the Latin and of the Teutonic minds respectively. The one looks without, the other within. For the one, the world of external 'fact'; for the other, the world of inner experience alone is real and significant. Both types of mind, and of theology, have strong and weak points: but the Latin genius has successfully established its own outlook as authoritative, and (to use an anachronism) orthodox. But may there not be room for both in an Universal Church? Cannot both grow together until the harvest?

Thus our chief criticism of Mr. Bouquet's elaborate and carefully constructed *apologia,* which is an admirable piece of work, scholarly and valuable, would be that perhaps he takes too restricted a view of Christian experience. The type of Christian for whom values come first and 'facts' nowhere, may be 'gnostic,' but who shall say such Christians are rejected by Christ? 'Why judgest thou thy brother? To his own Master he standeth or falleth—yea, and he shall stand.'

J. C. HARDWICK.

A LIBERAL ON THE LAMBETH CONFERENCE.

This little book* contains nine admirably simple addresses explanatory of the Lambeth Conference Letters and Reports. It is obviously intended for simple people, but it throws light upon many of the subjects, with which the bishops had to deal, that cause not a few difficulties to many educated Churchmen. Mr. Cohu finds himself in absolute agreement with the Report, save in one case. He feels that the expression, 'The commission of Christ,' as it is used in connection with the defence of Episcopacy, is 'likely to prove fatal to re-union with non-episcopal Churches.' It savours too much of 'that divine right' and 'Apostolic Succession' claim of bishops which non-episcopalians will have none of. Mr. Cohu is wonderfully fair in his treatment of disputed points, *e.g.* Divorce and the New Religions, yet finds himself in agreement with the Lambeth resolutions on these subjects. We wish there had been a chapter dealing with the work of the Conference Committee on Missionary Problems, one of the most neglected, but surely not the least important, of the Reports. Mr. Cohu brings out again and again in this book the forward-looking mind of the Conference: 'The tendency to say "the old is good" is far too strong in the Church,' 'at times it becomes our duty, while faithfully retaining the lessons of the sacred past, in a very

**Addresses on the Lambeth Conference.* By the Rev. J. R. Cohu, M.A. Pp. 128. Skefflington & Son, Ltd., 5/- net.

special sense to trust ourselves to His inspiration in that present which is our time of opportunity.' Mr. Cohu is always interesting, and any parish priest who wishes to propagate the ideas and ideals of the Lambeth Conference of 1920 among his people will find this book of great service for that purpose.

H. L. HUBBARD.

PASTORAL WORK TO-DAY *

It is probably true to say that there are few men in the Anglican Communion to-day who are better fitted to write of the pastoral life than the Bishop of Lichfield. Himself a devoted parish priest for many years, his present office brings him into close touch with parochial problems of all kinds. He is a man of modern sympathies, recognizing the unique opportunities and tremendous possibilities of the present day. His book takes a wide and generous view of a parish priest's work, and we are truly grateful for the illness which gave him leisure to write it. One or two chapters in the book call for special mention. In writing of 'Preachers and Teachers' (and later of 'Study'), he lays down with great emphasis the importance for the parish priest of a real and constant study of the fundamental truths of the Christian faith. The clergy of to-day are woefully behind their forefathers in this respect. They are worn out with over-much serving of tables: and a diminishing congregation brings home to them the painful fact that they have been failing to feed the flock of Christ with the word of God. That is not the sole reason for the falling-off in church going among the laity: but it is well to be reminded that the clergy must be diligent students if they are to commend the truth as it is in Jesus to men and women of to-day. The attitude of the Church to the social movement is clearly expounded, and Dr. Kempthorne reveals himself as a disciple, albeit a modern one, of Bishop Westcott. This is a book which it would be hard to criticize. We can only give it unstinted praise.

H. L. HUBBARD.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE CHRIST OF HISTORY.

To the Editor of the MODERN CHURCHMAN.

SIR,

I am tempted to submit to you a friendly criticism of Mr. Gamble's striking paper in your last number.

His analysis of the three ways of regarding the Historic Christ—the Didactic, the Eschatological and the Mythical—is quite sound in logic. But I cannot follow him when he writes that we have to choose between them. 'I do not think,' he writes, 'that it is possible to combine the three by the favourite device of taking a bit from each and disregarding the rest,' 'The Eschatological Christ I believe to be the Christ of history.' Certainly in the earliest stratum of the Gospels all three elements are found. If we want to gain a notion of the historic Christ, we must somehow account for all three. This must be done not by taking a bit from each, but by trying to combine all three in a higher unity. It is a task which has never been fully accomplished; probably never will be, but it must be our aim. To apply to a historic figure the favourite Ger

* *Pastoral Life and Work To-day*, by the BISHOP OF LICHFIELD. Pp. xvi + 17[illegible] (London, Longmans, Green and Co., 6/- net.)

man device, either—or, is to allow logic to strangle history. Logic cannot solve the complexities of life and conduct. Let us try Mr. Gamble's method, by applying it to a well-known modern character, say Mr. Gladstone. Mr. Gladstone may be regarded in three aspects—as a statesman, as a High Churchman, and as a Homeric scholar. We cannot, according to Mr. Gamble, combine these three aspects by taking a bit from each. We must regard Mr. Gladstone exclusively in one of the three aspects. In that case, following my own bent, I should regard him exclusively as a Homeric scholar. Certainly it would be a simplification; and I need not trouble myself much about Lord Morley's life. But in fact Mr. Gladstone, like all striking individuals, had several facets, and they were all facets of an actual personality, by no means always self-consistent.

Of course it would not be fair to expect Mr. Gamble fully to explain his view in twelve pages. He would need a treatise; and it would be an interesting treatise, I should expect to find in it much valuable suggestion. But even in the twelve pages he is not wholly consistent; nor does he succeed in his attempt to reach a purely eschatological point of view, to the exclusion of the others. He writes that, according to Jesus, the test is not what a man does, but what he is: a man may give all his goods to feed the poor, and yet he may lack the one thing needful. But this is the essence of the teaching of Jesus, according to such 'didactic' works as *Ecce Homo*. The mythical view Mr. Gamble does not discuss, except in its extreme and exaggerated form. But I feel sure that he, like all critical students of the Gospels, would allow that in some cases the familiarity of the Evangelists with the utterances of the prophets of Israel did tend to colour the narrative which they wrote.

Though a large part of the eschatological chapter in Mark is, according to Dr. Charles, apocryphal, yet it can scarcely be denied that Jesus did expect a sudden and cataclysmic coming of the Divine Kingdom; in this he was the child of his age. But this anticipation, and the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount, were two sides of something far greater than either, an intense and unmatched sense of the reality of spiritual values. It was by living in this spiritual world, and making His disciples live in it, that Jesus Himself provided the Christian society with the means for merging the hope of a cataclysm in the desire for the presence on earth of the Divine Kingdom, and for translating the paradoxes of the Sermon on the Mount into a working code of ethics.

P. GARDNER.

PRAYER BOOK REVISION.

To the Editor of the MODERN CHURCHMAN.

SIR,

In the *Modern Churchman* for December last there was an interesting review by the Rev. C. Emmet, headed a 'Proposed Revised Prayer Book.' At a well attended meeting of the W. London Branch of the Churchmen's Union held on Tuesday, February 22nd, at the house of Dr. W. D. Morrison, Rector of St. Marylebone, the subject was brought forward in an able paper under the heading, 'Conformity in Modern Worship to the Modern Outlook,' by the Rev. W. Bainbridge-Bell, Vicar of Epsom. In the discussion that followed, I tried to emphasize a matter that I think both in Mr. Emmet's review and in Mr. Bell's paper had been either unintentionally overlooked or purposely avoided.

I maintained and maintain that the 'Prayer of Consecration' in the Communion office, if it is to be brought up into line with modern scholar-

ship and the modern outlook, should be corrected in a most important particular. That prayer, which first appears in Edward the VI's second Prayer Book of 1552, was drawn up in accordance with the text of the 'Great Bible' of 1540. The clause to which I objected at the meeting and object now as being unreal and inaccurate, is that part of the prayer which proclaims that our Lord 'did institute and in His holy Gospel command us to continue, &c.' In face of our present knowledge of the New Testament, it may safely be asserted that the direction, 'Do this, &c.,' is unwarranted by any authentic text in any one of the Gospels. It is entirely Pauline and not Evangelical. It is absent from our earliest Gospel according to St. Mark (a very significant omission in view of the tradition derived from Papias that St. Mark, as the interpreter of St. Peter, wrote down the 'reminiscences' of that Apostle, an eye witness and ear witness at the Last Supper). It is also lacking in the Gospel according to St. Matthew. The reference in the prayer is doubtless to the statement in St. Luke, but the text here, as the Revised Version in its marginal note shows us, is corrupt. The passage does not occur in that Gospel in Codex D and some of the MSS of the old Latin translations. Moreover our greatest textual scholars, Westcott and Hort, affirm that 'there is no moral doubt' that it forms no part of Luke's original work. It may be said, of course, that the '-command' occurs in I Cor., xi, but the Prayer of Consecration should at least accurately represent the facts. The force of my contention was, I fear, missed at the meeting mentioned above as a great many ladies were present and I inadvertently quoted the Greek 'τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν' in which citation they doubtless failed to follow me. My objection to the reference to St. Luke's Gospel being retained in the Prayer is, I gather from his *Exploratio Evangelica*, shared by the respected President of our Union, Prof. Percy Gardner (p. 453 *lib. cit.*).

Something even might be said as to the genuineness of the text in I Cor., xi. Many scholars, including Schläger and the writers of the Dutch school, maintain that in that chapter, verses 22 to 33, are an interpolation of the Institution of the Eucharist therein recorded. Brückner says it is 'not historical' and Loisy takes the same view. According to a Roman Catholic pronouncement Loisy has stated, 'In Paul's account of the Institution of the Eucharist (I Cor., xi, 23—25) we must not take everything historically.' Bousset, in his *Jesus* E.T., page 35, says: 'If (note this 'if') on the last evening of His life Christ gave His disciples bread and wine as His Body and Blood, it is most improbable that He meant thereby to institute a regular rite.' See also same work, page 100, and again at page 206: 'Only one thing is probably certain, that at the original Supper Jesus did not mean to institute a Sacrament in the Catholic, Lutheran or Calvinistic sense.' See also Wellhausen on this subject, page 1,052 of Mr. Claude G. Montefiore's *Synoptic Gospels*.

In addition to the uncertainty as to the genuineness of the text of I Cor., xi, a further difficulty arises from the fact that the revelation claimed by St. Paul was given in *a vision*, for that apostle says, in these high matters, he 'conferred not with flesh and blood,' but 'received them of the Lord.' Such a claim it is almost impossible to substantiate, as we feel directly we come to examine the visions recorded by George Fox, of Swedenborg, of St. Teresa, of Mahomet, and other mystics. Were the alleged revelations merely 'subjective impressions' or objective realities? The modern age almost unanimously adopts the former and rejects the latter view, and is inclined to doubt all visions not personally experienced by those outside the recipient of them.

However, to bring the matter to a close. In the Prayer of Conse-

cration to which the above remarks refer, to delete the whole account of the Institution as non-historical would be at present, at least, too drastic for believers in general, however lightly that Institution may be regarded or altogether ignored by the Friends, Christian Scientists and other non-conforming bodies.

I would therefore suggest that the prayer in question should run as at present up to and including 'and did institute,' and then proceed 'and by His holy apostle, St. Paul, command us to continue, &c. . . . Hear us, &c., &c., who in the same night that He was betrayed, as delivered by the said apostle, St. Paul, in one of his Epistles, 'took bread, &c., saying, &c. Do this in remembrance of Me, &c.,' and so on to the end.

Surely this would be more in accordance with our present knowledge of the Gospels than the mis-statement recited in our existing formula, which strikes every student as unwarranted and out of date.

J. HECTOR DE COURCELLES.

March, 1921.

THE OLD TESTAMENT IN SCHOOLS.

To the Editor of THE MODERN CHURCHMAN.

SIR,

May I, as a Liberal Churchman, utter a respectful protest against the dictum of Professor Bethune-Baker in your March number: 'The chief reform in religious education that is needed is to banish the teaching of the Old Testament altogether from our schools.' The prospect of such banishment is one which would, I think, fill most practical school masters and school mistresses with dismay, and I find it hard to believe that the words quoted express the deliberate judgment of a Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity. It is difficult to give reasons for dissent in the short compass of a letter. I will be content to put down three considerations which seem almost aximatic: each of them could be developed at length.

1. The New Testament, it has been said, 'is written in terms of the Old,' and without it is wholly unintelligible.

2. The people for whom the Old Testament books were written were doubtless 'children' as compared with our mature selves: but so are the pupils in our schools. After making all due allowances for the crudity of much Old Testament theology and ethics, it remains true that these books present certain elementary theological and ethical ideas in a form in which they make the strongest possible appeal to the young.

3. Apart from religion (in the narrower sense), I can conceive no greater loss to the outfit of growing minds than to be deprived of the carefully guided study of the greatest of English classics. It is difficult to over-estimate the importance of early, and perhaps unconscious, assimilation of such literature: nor are its effects confined to the intellectual and imaginative faculties which we may for convenience treat apart from the spiritual faculty.

I am assuming that the treatment of the Old Testament in schools is selective, untraditional, and enlightened. I cannot think that the 'verse by verse' method of study of which Professor Bethune-Baker speaks is now in vogue in many schools.

ARTHUR F. HORT.

HARROW,

March 20th, 1921.

A CHURCHMEN'S UNION BIBLIOGRAPHY.

To the Editor of the MODERN CHURCHMAN.

SIR,

I think it is time that a bibliography should be compiled for publica-

tion of the theological works written by members of the Churchmen's Union. I should be glad to undertake the task if members will help me by sending me the names of the authors, the titles of their works, the publishers, and, if possible, the price.

PHILIP H. BAGENAL,
Hon. Sec. Churchmen's Union.

10 CLIFFORD STREET, BOND STREET,
LONDON, W. 1.

To the Editor of the MODERN CHURCHMAN.

SIR,

In my article of last month the Mystic should have been defined as 'one who, in seeking God, wishes to dispense with intermediate links and channels where other men use them,' not as 'one who, in seeking God, dispenses for the most part with intermediate links and channels, whether of reasoning or rite.' There are many Mystics to whom the latter phrase is quite inapplicable. The definition was correctly given in the earlier article, page 581.

CHARLES J. SHEBBEARE.

SWERFORD RECTORY,
ENSTONE, OXON.
March 30th, 1921.

IMPORTANT CHURCHMEN'S UNIONS NOTICES.

I. ELECTIONS TO THE COUNCIL.

TEN members will be elected at the time of the Annual Meeting to serve for three years on the Council to fill the places of those retiring in rotation. The candidates must be members of the Churchmen's Union. Any two members of the Union may nominate one or more candidates for election, who may be men or women. Such nominations (according to the constitution) must reach the Hon. Secretary, 10 Clifford Street, Bond Street, W.1, not later than May 1st. Election as before, by ballot. The following are those due to retire, and are not re-eligible until next year :—

Retiring Members of Council, 1921.

Hon. G. Coleridge, Rev. A. Fawkes, Rev. J. Gamble, Rev. F. E. Hutchinson, Rev. W. Lummis, Rev. H. D. A. Major, Dr. Norwood, Canon Papillon, Mrs. Reith and Mr. H. F. Walker.

Co-opted for 1920—1, but now eligible: Rev. Dr. Caldecott, Canon Rendall, Dr. A. J. Carlyle, Rev. C. Bass, Hon. Mrs. Matheson and Rev. H. R. L. Shepperd.

II. THE ANNUAL SERVICE AND MEETINGS.

The Annual Service will be held, by kind permission of the Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL.D., Rector of Marylebone, at St. Mary's Church, York Gate, Marylebone Road, at 11.30 a.m. on Thursday, June 16th (Baker Street and Regent Park Stations, Inner Circle railway).

The Annual Meeting for members only will be held subsequently at 3 p.m. at the Parish Church Institute Hall, 59—60 Paddington Street, off Baker Street, W.1, close to the church. Tea will be served at 4.30.

A Public Meeting will be held at 5 p.m. in the same Hall. Further details will be given next month.

P. H. BAGENAL,
Hon. Sec. Churchmen's Union.